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he Brazilian Legislation on bankruptcy is inspired on the 
US Bankruptcy Code when it comes to business 
reorganization1. It is important to note, however, that the 
legislations are not the same, but the Brazilian legislators have 
looked to the same principles of the Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code to build the Brazilian Business Reorganization 
in 2005, in order to create in a similar way some important 
institutes like the stay period, the plan of reorganization and the 
creditors meeting, among others. 
A general overview of the insolvency systems around the world 
shows us that before the US Bankruptcy Code of 1978 with the 
amendments of 1984 and 2005 there were only two insolvency 
models: creditor oriented legislations and debtor oriented 
legislations2. 
The US Business Reorganization has inaugurated a legislation that 
was not in favor of the creditor, nor in favor of the debtor. The 
system was built focusing on social benefits generated by the fact 
of keeping the business running. According to Collier on 
Bankruptcy, 
“Chapter 11 embodies a policy that it is generally 
preferable to enable a debtor to continue to operate and 
to reorganize or sell its business as a going concern rather 
than simply to liquidate a troubled business. Continued 
operation may enable the debtor to preserve any positive 
difference between the going concern value of the 
business and the liquidation value. Moreover, continued 
operation can save the jobs of employees, the tax base of 
communities, and generally reduce the upheaval that can 
result from termination of a business”3. 
In this sense, the creditors and the debtor must comply with the 
reorganization proceeding, acting in a collaborative way in order 
to ensure the best result of the case, preserving the business in 
function and therefore the jobs, revenues and all the good social 
effects that come from the company’s activities.  
                                                
1 D. COSTA, “Novas Teorias Sobre Processos De Insolvência E Gestão Democrática 
De Processos”, Comentáros À Nova Lei De Recuperação De Empresas E De Falências, Juruá, 
2015. 
2 Ibidem, note 184, pp. 134-135. 
3 A. RESNICK; H. SOMMER, Collier on Bankruptcy,  Matthew Bender Elite Products, 7-1100 
Collier on Bankruptcy P 1100.01 (15th 2015). 
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This principle has inspired the Brazilian legislator to enact the 
article 47 of the Law 11.101/05 which says: 
“The judicial reorganization aims to facilitate the 
overcoming of the situation of economic and financial 
crisis of the debtor in order to allow the maintenance of 
the production source, employment of workers and the 
interests of the creditors, thereby promoting the 
preservation of company, its social function and 
stimulating economic activity.” 
Based on this comparative analysis, we can affirm that the 
business reorganization in Brazil must comply with two new 
principles: the overcoming of the pendular dualism and the 
balanced sharing of the burdens4. 
§ 1 – THEORY OF THE OVERCOMING OF THE 
PENDULAR DUALISM 
Observing the development of the insolvency legislation 
throughout history, in the world and in Brazil, we can affirm that 
bankruptcy has evolved from individual and personal execution 
to collective process. The concepts of property of estate on 
bankruptcy and par conditio creditorum, created by Lex Iulia during 
the Roman Empire, are the result of this evolution5.  
The granting of the recovery possibility arose initially as a 
possibility of payments to creditors, with the protection of the 
debtor against corporal punishment. The institute evolved from 
the creditor's option to be considered as a benefit to be granted 
by the State6. 
1) The Evolution of the Bankruptcy Legislation in 
Brazil 
During the colonial period in Brazil, the first legislation that 
addressed the issue of insolvency were the Manoelinas 
Ordinances (1521) and the Philippines Ordinances (1603) – 
issued in Portugal - which established the arrest of the debtor to 
pay the debt. However, the debtor could assign its assets to 
creditors in order to avoid the imprisonment. It is observed in 
this period a strong medieval influence, providing rigorous and 
criminal treatment of bad faith debtors7. 
After that, the Decree of 11.13.1756 (Marques de Pombal) 
established the new bankruptcy system, which was suitable 
exclusively for entrepreneurs8.  
In the period following the independence of Brazil, there was the 
Commercial Code of 1850 as the leading insolvency law. 
Bankruptcy has become characterized by the cessation of 
                                                
4 D. COSTA, op. cit. note 302, pp. 17-62. 
5 E. PERIN JR, op. cit. note 233, pp. 30-32. 
6 D. COSTA, op. cit. note 302, pp. 32. 
7 E. PERIN JR, op. cit. note 233, pp. 36-37. 
8 W. FERREIRA, Instituições de Direito Comercial, 4th edition, Max Limonad, 1955 
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payments by the debtor. The bankruptcy was only granted if there 
was agreement from the majority of the creditors9. 
The Decree 917/1890 has created means to avoid liquidation: 
moratorium, assignment of assets, and extra-judicial and 
preventive bankruptcy agreement10. 
However, the new legal tools to avoid liquidation have started to 
be used fraudulently by the debtors. In this sense, in response to 
the proliferation of fraud in insolvency proceedings, it was 
enacted the Law 859/1902, which provided for a crackdown on 
abuse resulting from the moratorium11. 
The Law 2024/1908 improved the Brazilian system creating some 
important features: the definition of lateness as a cause of failure; 
characterization of acts of bankruptcy; suppression of friendly 
bankruptcy, having remained only a judicial composition; 
definition of bankruptcy crimes; liquidators number of the 
establishment in bankruptcy proceedings (01-03), chosen among 
the largest creditors, depending on the value of the bankruptcy 
estate. 
Further, as a result of the economic crisis and the need for the 
preservation of the companies, Law 5746/1929 has again 
extended the possibility of recovery of the company, creating 
percentages of credit to grant bankruptcy and reducing the 
number of liquidators for just one, thereby facilitating the access 
of entrepreneurs to overcome the crisis12. 
The Decree-Law 7661/45 has strengthened the powers of the 
judge, reducing the influence of the meetings of creditors and 
established bankruptcy (preventive and suspensive) as a benefit to 
be granted by the State. 
This law remained in force until 2005, when it was replaced by 
the current Bankruptcy Law 11,101/05. 
The Law 11.101/05 has an eminently social nature, with the 
recognition of the social function of the company. Accordingly, it 
grants the possibility of the business reorganization, to preserve 
the social and economic benefits arising from the viable business 
activity (jobs, income, tax collection, movement of goods and 
services etc.). 
2) The Existence of the Pendular Dualism 
During the evolution of the bankruptcy system, it is clear that the 
pendulum of the legal protection swings from the debtor 
protection to the creditor protection. In terms of insolvency law, 
the greater possibility of recovery by the moratorium is evidence 
that the legislation is debtor oriented. On the contrary, the smaller 
the moratorium possibilities, the more prestigious the equity 
interests of creditors13. 
                                                
9 E. PERIN JR, op. cit. note 233, p. 38. 
10 E. PERIN JR, op. cit.. pp. 39-40. 
11 Ibidem, p. 40. 
12 Ibid. p. 41. 
13 D. COSTA, op. cit.. note 302, p. 33. 
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It is clear that, during periods of economic crisis, the legislation 
has stimulated the moratorium. However, as a reaction to the 
abuse the debtors, the law used to bring limitations to the use of 
moratorium instruments, including giving criminal treatment to 
such fraudulent conduct. So, the legal protection pendulum goes 
from the creditor’s side to the debtor's side according to the need 
of business's stimulation or due the fraudulent conduct of the 
debtors. This is what Fabio Konder Comparato14 called pendular 
dualism in protecting the interests of creditors or debtors with 
regard to insolvency law. 
The great evolutionary leap represented by Law 11,101/05 was 
the recognition of the social function of business activity and the 
need to preserve this activity as maintenance assumption of all 
social and economic benefits arising from it. 
Moreover, there was also recognition of the need to create an 
enabling environment for negotiation between creditors and 
debtors in order to find the best solution for the company's crisis. 
The social interest represented by the preservation of social and 
economic benefits arising from the running business must prevail 
over the private interest of the debtor or creditors. 
3) Overcoming the Pendular Dualism 
The observation of what happens in legislative reforms over time 
highlights the existence of a constant pendulum that swings in 
protecting creditor or debtor (the poles of the relationship of 
substantive law)15.  
This phenomenon is also observed in relation to the Court’s 
interpretation of the law. So, not only the law takes sides in 
protecting creditor or debtor, but also the Courts seek to apply 
the law always in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant in a 
particular case16. 
However, the adequate interpretation of the Brazilian Bankruptcy 
Law, having in mind the article 4717 and the principles that come 
from the US Bankruptcy Code – which is a source of inspiration 
for the Brazilian law – leads us to the need of overcoming this 
dualism pendulum. It is necessary to move the focus of 
interpretation for the search of the useful purpose of the legal 
institution. The purpose of the institute and the proper 
                                                
14 T. AZEREDO,  “Parecer apresentado por Theophilo de Azeredo Santos ao IASP sobre 
o Projeto de Lei 4.376/93”,   
http://www.egov.ufsc.br/portal/sites/default/files/anexos/9567-9566-1-PB.pdf.,last 
visited in 18/08/2015 
15 See Evolution of the bankruptcy legislation in Brazil and the existence of the 
pendular dualism, D. COSTA, Op.cit. Part IV, A, I.. 
16 D. COSTA , op. cit.. note 302, at 34. 
17 Brazil, Lei no 11.101, de 9 de fevereiro de 2005, Diário Oficial da União (D.O.U.) de 
09.02.2005. (Braz.), Art. 47 “The judicial reorganization aims to facilitate the 
overcoming of the situation of economic and financial crisis of the debtor in order to 
allow the maintenance of the production source, employment of workers and the 
interests of the creditors, thereby promoting the preservation of company, its social 
function and stimulating economic activity”. 
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functioning of the legal system should take precedence over the 
protection of the interest of creditor or debtor. 
The legal pendulum has swung between creditor and debtor 
during the evolution of the institute, however it is the time to 
recognized that the pendulum should be shifted from the parties 
(creditor and debtor) for the best result of the reorganization 
proceeding and the effective implementation of the institute's 
own purpose. 
Thus, the adequate interpretation when it comes to business 
reorganization is that which leads to always honor the recovery of 
business activity in the light of relevant social benefits that result, 
despite the particular interest of one creditor or the debtor. One 
should always seek the fulfillment of employment, payment of 
taxes, heating of economic activity, income, earnings, movement 
of goods and wealth, even if it is given to the detriment of 
immediate interest of the debtor itself or creditors18. 
It is important to note that the business reorganization is not an 
absolute goal. It should only be made on the basis of relevant 
social benefits that will be produced due to the preservation and 
recovery of productive activity. If the company is not able to 
generate the social benefits, which the law intends to preserve, the 
bankruptcy liquidation will be the best option in order to meet 
the social interest19. 
The Brazilian Courts have already recognized the application of 
the theory of the overcoming of the pendular dualism. In In Re 
Intervia Tecnologia Ltda – ME, the trial judge has given an 
adequate interpretation to the article 51 of the Law 11,101/05, 
according to the theory of the overcoming of the pendular 
dualism. It was decided the following: 
“The complaint for business reorganization must be 
accompanied by financial statements, the balance sheet, 
the statement of retained earnings and from the last fiscal 
year, as well as management of cash flow and its 
projection report. It requires also a full report of the 
company's economic and commercial situation. […] This 
is because the purpose of the law is to ensure the 
continuity of business activity due to the social benefits 
deriving from it, such as generation and circulation of 
wealth, payment of taxes and, especially, employment and 
incomes. The simple decision authorizing the beginning 
of the business reorganization generates, by itself, the 
automatic stay, preventing the creditors from taking or 
continuing actions against the property of the company 
(debtor) for a period of 180 days (stay period), among 
other important legal consequences set out in art. 52 of 
the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law. […] (The) preliminary 
                                                
18 See the judicial decision, infra note 324.  
19 D. COSTA , “Reflexões sobre Processos de Insolvência: divisão equilibrada de ônus, 
superação do dualismo pendular e gestão democrática de processos”, 10 Anos Da Lei De 
Recuperação Judicial E Falências – Reflexões Sobre A Reestruturação Empresarial No Brasil, Luis 
Vasco Elias, Quartier Latin, 2015, pp. 87-111 
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analysis of such documents requires technical knowledge 
in order to understand the real meaning of the data 
reported by the debtor as well as the correspondence of 
such information with the reality of facts. The preliminary 
analisys is fundamental to ensure that the business 
reorganization proceeding could be used properly, 
fulfilling its social function, without imposing 
unreasonable burdens and losses to the community of 
creditors. […] In this sense, despite the Law 11,101/05 
does not require a previous expert analysis of the 
documentation submitted by the applicant company for 
business reorganization, the fact is that such expertise 
analisys should be inferred as a logical consequence of the 
legal requirements established as a condition for approval 
of its processing, namely, the regularity of the 
documentation presented by the debtor. […] The 
experience in the First Bankruptcy Court of São Paulo has 
shown that inadvertent approval of the beginning of the 
business reorganization, based solely on a formal check-
list of the documents submitted by the debtor, has served 
only to worsening the situation of creditors without any 
benefit to the business activity […] So, based on that 
interpretation of the law, before deciding on the 
beginning of the business reorganization, I determine a 
previous expert examination on the real operating 
situation of the company and also on the documents 
presented by the company, in order to check its 
correspondence with fiscal and trade books”20. 
The Intervia Tecnologia Ltda – ME has filed an interlocutory 
appeal seeking for the reversal of the judge’s decision saying that 
the Law does not leave any room for the determination of an 
expert examination. According to the company, the article 51 
should be interpreted literally. The Supreme Court of São Paulo 
upheld the decision saying that the interpretation of the law must 
comply with the best result of the reorganization proceeding and 
the effective implementation of the institute's own purpose. Thus, 
the judge, when interpreting article 51, can determine a expert 
examination on the documents and also on the operating 
conditions of the company, since the business reorganization 
should only be made on the basis of relevant social benefits that 
will be produced due to the preservation and recovery of 
productive activity. If it is possible to determine, even before the 
beginning of the case, that the company is not able to generate 
the social benefits, which the law intends to preserve, the 
beginning of the business reorganization proceeding must be 
denied in order to meet the social interest. 
                                                
20 Brazil, TJSP, Agravo de Instrumento No. 0194436-42.2012.8.26.0000, Relator: Des. 
Teixeira Leite, 02.10/2012, Diário Oficial do Estado de São Paulo (D.O.E.S.P.), 
06.10.2012. 
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§ 2 – THEORY OF THE BALANCED SHARING OF THE 
BURDEN OF THE BUSINESS REORGANIZATION 
It was already said that the Brazilian legislation on bankruptcy is 
inspired by the US Bankruptcy Code when it comes to business 
reorganization21. In this sense, it is possible to affirm that the 
principles that govern the business reorganization in the US 
Bankruptcy Code (Chapter 11) may be used as a source of 
interpretation of the Brazilian legislation. 
In the US system of business reorganization (Bankruptcy Code - 
11 USC Chapter 11), confirmation or approval of the plan 
depends on the judicial finding of some requirements or 
standards to ensure that the burden of business recovery are 
divided evenly between creditor and debtor. 
Even in the case of plans accepted by every class, section 1129 (a) 
of the Bankruptcy Code sets out 16 requirements that must be 
met as a condition for the approval of the plan submitted by the 
debtor. It ensures that the recovery plan is fair and has economic 
sense22. 
                                                
21See The New Theories in the Braziliam System Inspired on the US System, op. 
cit. Part IV 
22 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2005). “The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following 
requirements are met:(1)The plan complies with the applicable provisions of this title. 
(2)The proponent of the plan complies with the applicable provisions of this title. 
(3)The plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law. 
(4)Any payment made or to be made by the proponent, by the debtor, or by a person 
issuing securities or acquiring property under the plan, for services or for costs and 
expenses in or in connection with the case, or in connection with the plan and incident 
to the case, has been approved by, or is subject to the approval of, the court as 
reasonable. (5)(A)(i)The proponent of the plan has disclosed the identity and affiliations 
of any individual proposed to serve, after confirmation of the plan, as a director, officer, 
or voting trustee of the debtor, an affiliate of the debtor participating in a joint plan 
with the debtor, or a successor to the debtor under the plan; and (ii)the appointment to, 
or continuance in, such office of such individual, is consistent with the interests of 
creditors and equity security holders and with public policy; and (B)the proponent of 
the plan has disclosed the identity of any insider that will be employed or retained by 
the reorganized debtor, and the nature of any compensation for such insider. (6)Any 
governmental regulatory commission with jurisdiction, after confirmation of the plan, 
over the rates of the debtor has approved any rate change provided for in the plan, or 
such rate change is expressly conditioned on such approval. (7)With respect to each 
impaired class of claims or interests— (A)each holder of a claim or interest of such 
class— (i)has accepted the plan; or (ii)will receive or retain under the plan on account of 
such claim or interest property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not 
less than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were 
liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date; or (B)if section 1111(b)(2) of this 
title applies to the claims of such class, each holder of a claim of such class will receive 
or retain under the plan on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective 
date of the plan, that is not less than the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s 
interest in the property that secures such claims. (8)With respect to each class of claims 
or interests— (A)such class has accepted the plan; or (B)such class is not impaired 
under the plan. (9)Except to the extent that the holder of a particular claim has agreed 
to a different treatment of such claim, the plan provides that— (A)with respect to a 
claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(2) or 507(a)(3) of this title, on the effective 
date of the plan, the holder of such claim will receive on account of such claim cash 
equal to the allowed amount of such claim; (B)with respect to a class of claims of a kind 
specified in section 507(a)(1), 507(a)(4), 507(a)(5), 507(a)(6), or 507(a)(7) of this title, 
each holder of a claim of such class will receive— (i)if such class has accepted the plan, 
deferred cash payments of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the 
allowed amount of such claim; or (ii)if such class has not accepted the plan, cash on the 
effective date of the plan equal to the allowed amount of such claim; (C)with respect to 
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The US Business Reorganization system has been built focusing 
on social benefits generated by the fact of keeping the business 
running23. Therefore, creditors and the debtor must act in a 
collaborative way in order to keep the business running in 
function of the jobs, revenues and wealth that arises from the 
company’s activities. 
So, it shows that the US Business Reorganization system is also 
governed by the principle of the balanced sharing of the burden 
of the reorganization proceeding. 
It should be noted, therefore, that in the American system, the 
judicial balancing in the sharing of the burden of the 
reorganization proceeding between debtor and creditors may be 
done, for instance, by checking standards as fairness, feasibility, 
best interests of creditors, special treatment for priority claims, 
among others. 
Although Brazilian law is silent regarding the judicial control of 
the balancing of the sharing of the burden of the business 
reorganization, its realization is essential to ensure the practical 
                                                                                                    
a claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(8) of this title, the holder of such claim will 
receive on account of such claim regular installment payments in cash— (i)of a total 
value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; 
(ii)over a period ending not later than 5 years after the date of the order for relief under 
section 301, 302, or 303; and (iii)in a manner not less favorable than the most favored 
nonpriority unsecured claim provided for by the plan (other than cash payments made 
to a class of creditors under section 1122(b); and (D)with respect to a secured claim 
which would otherwise meet the description of an unsecured claim of a governmental 
unit under section 507(a)(8), but for the secured status of that claim, the holder of that 
claim will receive on account of that claim, cash payments, in the same manner and 
over the same period, as prescribed in subparagraph (C). (10)If a class of claims is 
impaired under the plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has 
accepted the plan, determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any 
insider. (11)Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or 
the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the 
debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the 
plan.(12)All fees payable under section 1930 of title 28, as determined by the court at 
the hearing on confirmation of the plan, have been paid or the plan provides for the 
payment of all such fees on the effective date of the plan. (13)The plan provides for the 
continuation after its effective date of payment of all retiree benefits, as that term is 
defined in section 1114 of this title, at the level established pursuant to subsection 
(e)(1)(B) or (g) of section 1114 of this title, at any time prior to confirmation of the 
plan, for the duration of the period the debtor has obligated itself to provide such 
benefits. (14)If the debtor is required by a judicial or administrative order, or by statute, 
to pay a domestic support obligation, the debtor has paid all amounts payable under 
such order or such statute for such obligation that first become payable after the date of 
the filing of the petition. (15)In a case in which the debtor is an individual and in which 
the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the plan— 
(A)the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of the property to be distributed under 
the plan on account of such claim is not less than the amount of such claim; or (B)the 
value of the property to be distributed under the plan is not less than the projected 
disposable income of the debtor (as defined in section 1325(b)(2)) to be received during 
the 5-year period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan, or 
during the period for which the plan provides payments, whichever is longer. (16)All 
transfers of property under the plan shall be made in accordance with any applicable 
provisions of nonbankruptcy law that govern the transfer of property by a corporation 
or trust that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation or trust. 
23 See the new theories, op. cit. note 324. 
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result of the recovery of companies and it is, obviously, a 
necessary consequence of the system24. 
In the Brazilian system, the business reorganization must comply 
with article 47 of the Law 11.101/0525. So, it is possible to affirm 
that the use of this legal tool in Brazil only makes sense on the 
basis of the achievement of the social and economic benefits 
resulting from the continuation of the business activities. It is also 
true that the business reorganization should rest on the 
assumption of the sharing of its burden between debtor and 
creditors, because the Law does not seek the protection of the 
rights of creditors, nor the protection of the interests of the 
debtor. Every player involved in the proceeding must collaborate 
in order to ensure the reaching of the social interest. 
Creditors shall bear losses in the short and medium term, 
considering that they will be prevented from carrying out their 
claims for a certain period of time (stay period). In addition, the 
creditors shall support a plan of reorganization that may involve, 
as it usually occurs, an extra time for the payment of the 
obligations of the debtor. The plan may also bring haircuts or 
discounts for the due payments26. 
However, in the other hand, the business reorganization shall be 
good for the creditors in the medium and long term, since they 
will receive their credits, although in new terms. In addition, the 
creditors will have the possibility of compensating their losses in 
the medium or long term, whereas the company will continue in 
function and, therefore, it will continue to negotiate with its 
suppliers27. 
So it is important to note that the burden borne by the creditors 
makes sense only if the company meets the goals of the business 
reorganization. In other words, the creditors shall bear their 
burdens only if the debtor keeps on running, generates jobs and 
creates all the other benefits that arise from the effective exercise 
of its activities. 
The debtor must also bear its burdens. The company must act 
transparently and in good faith, keep jobs, collect taxes, produce 
and circulate goods and services and ultimately preserve the 
economic and social benefits that are sought with the 
maintenance of business activity. The company in bankruptcy 
protection has the obligation to seek at all costs to preserve the 
social and economic benefits sought by the institute of the 
business reorganization28.  
The debtor must also present a recovery plan that can be 
considered feasible, reasonable and fair. The plan must make 
                                                
24 D. COSTA, “Reflexões sobre processos de insolvência: divisão equilibrada de ônus, 
superação do dualismo pendular e gestão democrática de processos”, Cadernos Jurídicos V 
16, pp. 59-77. 
25 See the new theories, D. COSTA, s. note 324. 
26 D. COSTA, “A divisão equilibrada de ônus na recuperação judicial da empresa” 
Falência, Insolvência E Recuperação De Empresas – Estudos Luso-Brasileiros, Newton de Lucca 
and Miguel Pestana de Vasconcelos, Quartier Latin, 2015 pp. 47-63. 
27 D. COSTA , op. cit.. note 304, at 24. 
28D. COSTA, op. cit.  note 304, at 24. 
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economic sense, within the balanced division of burdens between 
creditors and debtors29. 
In addition, the debtor shall promptly meet the requirements set 
out by the judge. The debtor must be collaborative with the 
trustee and must also fulfill faithfully the proceeding deadlines. 
The debtor must act aligned with the purpose of the procedure 
and therefore must always be guided by absolute transpareny and 
good faith, as a logical consequence of the principle of a balanced 
sharing of burdens30. 
In the Brazilian system, the trustee and the judge have the duty of 
monetizing the adequate sharing of the burdens in the business 
reorganization proceeding.  
The trustee must pay closely attention at the conduct of the 
debtor for the proper exercise of their function. The trustee will 
not take over the management of the company, but must be very 
careful in monitoring the business activities made by its officers in 
order to make sure that the resources earned by the debtor during 
the stay period are being applied to activities consistent with the 
Institute purposes. Likewise, should the trustee monitor very 
closely the respect of deadlines by debtor as well as its procedural 
conduct, which must also be compatible with the purpose of the 
reorganization.31  
The judge will control the sharing of burden when analyzing the 
debtor’s conduct during the case and the negotiation between 
creditors and debtor. The judge must prevent the abuse of the 
dominant position by some creditor during the negotiation of the 
plan. In the same sense, the judge must check the legal 
boundaries of the plan. It is not appropriate to confirm a plan 
with illegal, fraudulent or unfair clauses32. 
The Brazilian law says nothing about the judicial control over the 
plan. The article 58 of the Law 11,101/05 determines the judicial 
confirmation of the plan if its clauses have been approved at the 
creditor’s meeting. 
According to article 58,  
“ Fulfilled the requirements of this Law, the judge will 
grant the business reorganization of the debtor whose 
plan has not suffered creditor’s objection pursuant to art. 
55 of this Law or has been approved by the general 
meeting of creditors pursuant to art. 45 of this Law” 33. 
Again, it is important to point out that, despite the absence of 
explicit regulation on the judicial control of the plan, it is possible 
to use the US model as a complementary source of interpretation 
of the Brazilian law. Since the US Bankruptcy Law is governed by 
the balanced sharing of the burdens, it is possible to affirm that 
                                                
29 Ibidem. at 25 
30 D. COSTA , Op. ct. note 329. 
31 D. COSTA, “Divisão equilibrada de ônus da Recuperação”, O Valor Econômico, march 
20, 2014, at E1.  
32 D. COSTA, “Teoria da Distribuição Equilibrada dos ônus na Recuperação Judicial da 
Empresa”, Carta Forense, november 7, 2013, B18 - B18. 
33 Lei no 11.101, de 9 de fevereiro de 2005, Diário Oficial da União (D.O.U.) de 
09.02.2005. (Braz.), Art 58. 
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the Brazilian judge can use the essence of the standards laid down 
by Section 1129(a), if they are compatible with the Brazilian law34. 
Therefore, there is no doubt that the Brazilian judge must control 
the legal boundaries of the plan. But, in addition to it, the judge 
must also ensure the feasibility and the fairness of the plan by 
preventing abuse and fraud.  
The Brazilian Courts have already recognized the judicial control 
power over the legal aspects of the plan and also the control over 
the feasibility, fairness, best interest of the creditors, good faith 
and prevention of fraud. In In Re CONSTRULEV INDÚSTRIA 
E COMÉRCIO DE PLÁSTICOS LTDA35, the 1st Bankruptcy 
Court of São Paulo has approved the plan, after doing the judicial 
analysis over the plan. The Itaú Bank, as a creditor, has filed an 
interlocutory appeal seeking for the rejection of the plan on the 
basis that it should be considered unfair in comparison to the 
conditions offered to other creditors, and also abusive since it has 
imposed a disproportionate loss to some creditors. The Supreme 
Court of São Paulo upheld the decision, saying that there was no 
abusive clause, nor unfair treatment of the creditors. In addition, 
the Court has said: 
“If the plan approved by the AGC depends on the Court 
approval, it is because “there is a public policy, which 
requires the court to observe more than just its legality 
and constitutionality, but also ethics, good faith, respect 
for creditors and the manifest intention to meet the 
recovery target, under the penalty of breaking the spirit of 
Law n. 11,101/2005” 36. 
Note that the default by debtor of its burdens may cause the 
conversion of the bankruptcy reorganization into bankruptcy 
liquidation. Although there is no rule on that in the Brazilian law, 
it seems clear that the disappearance of the fundamentals of the 
institute of the business reorganization should cause the 
convertion of the case into a liquidation of the company based on 
the theory of the balanced sharing of the burdens37. 
CONCLUSION 
It is important to bear in mind that the Brazilian Bankruptcy 
System has found inspiration in the US Bankruptcy Code. 
Therefore, the interpretation of the Brazilian law can take some 
features from the US Bankruptcy System as a manner of 
improving the application of the law and ensuring the best result 
for the case. 
                                                
34 D. COSTA , op. cit.. note 302, at. 26. 
35 Brazil, TJSP, Agravo de Instrumento No. 2147847-50.2015.8.26.0000, Relator: Des. 
Maia da Cunha, 28.10.2015, Diário Oficial do Estado de São Paulo (D.O.E.S.P), 
03.11.2015 . 
36 Brazil, TJSP, Agravo de Instrumento No. 2147847-50.2015.8.26.0000, Relator: Des. 
Maia da Cunha, 28.10.2015, Diário Oficial do Estado de São Paulo (D.O.E.S.P), 
03.11.2015. 
37 D. COSTA , op. cit. note 302, at 25. 
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In this sense, the theory of the overcoming the dualistic 
pendulum has been created in Brazil, based on the observation of 
the evolution of the insolvency systems worldwide, but mainly on 
the fact that the US Bankruptcy Code has inaugurated a new 
insolvency model where the social interest must prevail over the 
particular interest of debtors and creditors. So, in Brazil, as it is 
being done in the US, the insolvency law must be applied in 
accordance to social interest. The business reorganization must be 
interpreted in order to ensure the maintenance of the production 
source, employment of workers and the interests of the creditors, 
thereby promoting the preservation of the company, its social 
function and the stimulation of economic activity. 
The theory of the balanced sharing of burden of the business 
reorganization also rests its basis on the US Bankruptcy system. 
This theory is based on the observation of the US system of the 
judicial control over the plan of reorganization. In the US 
Bankruptcy Code, the judge ought to check the plan approved by 
the creditors in order to find its compliance with some standards 
that ensure the adequate sharing of the burdens among creditors 
and debtors. 
Based on this idea, and according to this new theory, the Brazilian 
Courts have decided that the Brazilian judge, despite the absence 
of an explicit legal rule, has the power of observe the legality and 
constitutionality of the plan of reorganization. Further, these 
judges can decide the ethics, good faith, respect for creditors, and 
the manifest intention to meet the recovery target under the 
penalty of breaking the spirit of Law n° 11,101/05. 
 
 
 
